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In this paper, we examine the concept of embodied uncertainty by exploring
multiple dimensions of uncertainty in the context of risks associated with
extreme natural hazards. We highlight a need for greater recognition, particularly
by disaster management and response agencies, of uncertainty as a subjective
experience for those living at risk. Embodied uncertainty is distinguished from
objective uncertainty by the nature of its internalisation at the individual level,
where it is subjective, felt and directly experienced. This approach provides a
conceptual pathway that sharpens knowledge of the processes that shape how
individuals and communities interpret and contextualise risk. The ways in which
individual characteristics, social identities and lived experiences shape interpreta-
tions of risk are explored by considering embodied uncertainty in four contexts:
social identities and trauma, the co-production of knowledge, institutional struc-
tures and policy and long-term lived experiences. We conclude by outlining the
opportunities that this approach presents, and provide recommendations for
further research on how the concept of embodied uncertainty can aid decision-
making and the management of risks in the context of extreme natural hazards.
Keywords: disaster; embodied uncertainty; emergency management; knowledge
co-production; risk interpretation
1. Introduction
To examine the concept of embodied uncertainty, this paper explores multiple
dimensions of uncertainty in the context of living with extreme natural hazards.
These dimensions are overlapping and may co-exist in any particular context, given
that uncertainty and risk are prevailing conditions of everyday life. In this paper, risk
is deﬁned as ‘a function of the characteristics and frequency of hazards experienced
in a speciﬁed location, the nature of the elements at risk, and their inherent degree
of vulnerability or resilience’ (Benson et al. 2007, 16). Individuals, organisations,
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institutions and societies constantly deal with and embody risk, for example, in the
form of the multiple layers of uncertainty associated with the threat of natural haz-
ards, such as wildﬁre and ﬂooding. The exact time, location, intensity and frequency
of potential wildﬁre or ﬂooding are constant unknowns, which make estimations of
likelihood, vulnerability, severity, resource needs and the adequacy of disaster relief
packages uncertain (Morrice 2012; Eriksen 2014; Simon 2014). Furthermore, such
uncertainty is not universally observed, known and measured, but is subjectively
interpreted by those who live at-risk, and those who attempt to manage it. Such indi-
vidual and collective interpretations of risks lead to decisions about why and how
we live in landscapes of uncertainty (Thompson and Warburton 1985; Macnaghten
2003; Robbins and Moore 2013).
Uncertainty tends to be categorised as epistemic – derived from incomplete
knowledge, or aleatory – a product of intrinsic natural variability (sometimes called
‘natural stochastic uncertainty’, or ‘variability uncertainty’) (Walker et al. 2003; Patt
and Dessai 2005; van Asselt and Vos 2006). In the climate change literature, aleatory
uncertainty is part of a category of ‘unknowable knowledge’, which includes the
‘human reﬂexive uncertainty’ in response to climatic change and the uncertain out-
comes of such actions. This category of uncertainty is considered to be irreducible for
predictive purposes (Dessai and Hulme 2004), due to the fact that humans are part of
the problem, system and potential solutions (Patt and Dessai 2005).
The uncertainty discourse in risk studies focuses mostly on scientiﬁc uncertainty
as it relates to absent and/or conﬂicting knowledge, and how that uncertainty con-
tributes to difﬁculties in assessing probabilities and consequences (Renn, Klinke,
and van Asselt 2011). Scientiﬁc enquiry is considered to be a pathway to reducing
epistemic uncertainty over time (Taddei 2012). However, uncertainty is not simply
an absence of knowledge. Indeed, it may prevail where substantial information is
available, particularly when new knowledge reveals new uncertainties, information
is interpreted in very different ways, and/or there are diverse understandings of how
best to characterise the uncertainty (van Asselt and Rotmans 2002; Walker et al.
2003; Dessai and Hulme 2004; Adler and Hirsch Hadorn 2014). Thus, risk can arise
from both certainty and uncertainty, while uncertainty propagates through assess-
ments of risk (Jones 2000).
Uncertainty often exists around both the likelihood of an event and the value of
its consequences (Eiser et al. 2012). The value of an event may involve an objective
calculation of the monetary costs, or a subjective interpretation of the (un)desired
outcomes. Different actors perceive values differently: one actor’s loss may be
another’s gain, and the consequences are typically distributed unevenly across time
and space. Eiser et al. (2012), therefore, call for further research to understand how
past experiences, feelings, values, beliefs, social norms and characteristics may
shape risk interpretation and decision-making under uncertain conditions. In this
paper, we build on this call by examining how uncertainty in the context of extreme
natural hazards lies not only in cause and effect, but also within processes. We
demonstrate how uncertainty is experienced, internalised and becomes embedded
within decision-making and social norms over time. These processes are often non-
linear, indeterminate and complex.
To enhance understanding among the disaster management and risk reduction
communities of uncertainty as multifaceted and prevailing in different forms, and at
different levels and time scales, we explore how uncertainty is framed and commu-
nicated, decisions made, and risks embodied. Uncertainty may involve objective
2 V. Sword-Daniels et al.
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entities, or subjective realities; it may be widely observed, sensed and collectively
shared, or completely internal to the individual. Inﬂuences on uncertainty may also
be reducible or irreducible, and known or unknown. We draw from many disciplines
and ﬁelds of research (including geography, disaster studies, sociology, psychology,
earth sciences, public policy and political science) to provide a broad review of how
uncertainty is treated in a range of literatures. We argue that there is a need for
greater recognition, particularly by disaster management and response agencies, of
uncertainty as a subjective experience for those living in areas exposed to natural
hazards. The concept of embodied uncertainty provides a conceptual pathway to ini-
tiate discourse around experiential and lived uncertainty. We discuss this concept in
the context of disasters and risk, particularly extreme natural hazards, and present
questions, challenges and opportunities for moving forward in uncertainty thinking.
2. Problematising uncertainty
2.1. Scientiﬁc framing of uncertainty
Early deﬁnitions of uncertainty differentiate between two types of uncertainty: mea-
surable uncertainty (deﬁned as ‘risk’ proper) and immeasurable uncertainty (Knight
1921). Scientiﬁc framings view scientiﬁc knowledge (often technological) as the
key to measuring and reducing uncertainty (Wynne 1992). The conventional
approach to managing uncertainty has been to reduce unknowns to measurable ‘risk’
(Stirling 2008, 2010). However, reducing uncertainty may lead to ignorance, as
possibilities are necessarily removed from consideration in order to proceed with
structured investigation (Wynne 1992). For example, a study of NASA’s decision-
making prior to the Columbia space shuttle disaster in 2003 found that, leading up
to the disaster, there was overconﬁdence in quantitative data and marginalisation of
non-quantiﬁable information, which created insensitivity to the uncertainty involved
and loss of institutional memory (Feldman 2004).
Uncertainty is a wide-ranging concept and a spectrum of typologies exists. For
example, in the model-based decision support literature, three dimensions of uncer-
tainty are deﬁned: location (where uncertainty manifests), level (amount of knowl-
edge) and nature (epistemic or aleatory). Within these dimensions, the level of
uncertainty has been described on a ﬁve-level spectrum from ‘determinism’ (com-
plete knowledge) to ‘total ignorance’ (Walker et al. 2003). Bammer, Smithson, and
The Goolabri Group (2008) employ a ‘taxonomy of unknowns’, which starts with
ignorance as an overarching term that branches into two fundamental types: error
(incomplete knowledge) and irrelevance (deliberately ignored). The former leads to
a state of incompleteness, and then to uncertainty as the taxonomy narrows. In this
taxonomy, uncertainty itself is then comprised of vagueness, probability and
ambiguity. Yet another typology deﬁnes quadrants of uncertainty – risk, ambiguity,
uncertainty and ignorance – based on axes that chart the level of knowledge of
probabilities and the level of knowledge of possibilities (Stirling 2010).
The non-linear and dynamic nature of many complex social and environmental
systems leaves uncertainty irreducible in many cases. There is a growing acceptance
– particularly among those from science and technology studies – that further
knowledge will not necessarily provide solutions. Instead, learning to manage igno-
rance is necessary (Dovers and Handmer 1992; Stirling 2010; Adler and Hirsch
Hadorn 2014). For example, in the context of a changing environment, acceptance
Journal of Risk Research 3
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of irreducible or ‘deep uncertainties’ (Haasnoot et al. 2013) may offer planners a
pathway for adapting solutions over time to address changing circumstances. Such
approaches accept uncertainty and account for it by committing to short-term actions
(e.g. mitigation), and establishing a framework of adaptive pathways for future
actions that incorporate experiences and learning over time (Haasnoot et al. 2013;
Walker, Haasnoot, and Kwakkel 2013). Rather than trying to reduce uncertainty and
risk by oversimplifying a situation (wilful ignorance), we argue that accepting uncer-
tainty as complex and non-linear promotes innovative ways of thinking, and opens
up new approaches for addressing uncertain situations.
This is not without its challenges, particularly as the inherent complexity in
addressing these uncertain situations demands approaches and structures that facili-
tate and accommodate this complexity. Characterising this complexity entails three
distinct types of information: (1) fundamental understandings of components and
dynamics within and between systems (systems knowledge); (2) knowledge that
helps clarify and prioritise the desired and valued outcomes by society when dealing
with impacts and drivers of disasters (target knowledge); and (3) knowledge on how
to transform the system by, for example, enacting policies that address and mitigate
the effects and impacts of disasters in society (transformation knowledge). Reconcil-
ing systems, target and transformation knowledge calls for transdisciplinary
approaches that are sensitive to the speciﬁc socio-economic context where disasters
manifest (Hirsch Hadorn et al. 2008).
Transdisciplinary approaches are characterised by their problem-oriented focus
and, increasingly, the co-production of transformation knowledge (i.e. knowledge
for problem solving) that effectively bridges the gap between the problematic status
quo and the desired goal (Hirsch Hadorn et al. 2008). These approaches account for
complexity by incorporating both the everyday world and theoretical constructions
of problems, and thus have been adopted by many communities of practice, includ-
ing: future studies (Tapio and Hietanen 2002), sustainability science (Cash et al.
2003), systemic learning (Blackmore et al. 2011), action research (Greenwood and
Levin 1998), transition management (Loorbach, Frantzeskaki, and Thissen 2011),
participatory research (Bidwell 2009; Kasemir et al. 2003), policy sciences (Ascher
2007) and post-normal science (Funtowicz and Ravetz 1993). Under conditions of
high risk and high uncertainty, Funtowicz and Ravetz (1993, 753) recommend scien-
tiﬁc research should consider ‘extended facts’, which include community values,
history, personal experiences and other ‘non-traditional’ science information. Stirling
(2010) recommends that where knowledge of probabilities and possibilities become
less well known (outside the ‘risk’ space), the realms of ambiguity, uncertainty and
ignorance require participatory deliberation, scenario methods and adaptive and resi-
lient approaches to inform decision-making. Such approaches embrace multiple
interpretations and options, which inform policy-makers about the alternatives, and
thereby make decision-making more democratically accountable (Stirling 2010).
This acceptance of uncertainty may lead to a better understanding of how uncer-
tainty is embodied within co-produced knowledge and within institutional settings,
structures and policy.
2.2. Uncertainty and decision-making
In the disaster risk reduction community, much research on uncertainty has focused
on either decision-making under uncertainty or the communication of uncertainty
4 V. Sword-Daniels et al.
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(Cutter et al. 2015). In the decision-making literature many studies focus on rational
choice models (Becker 1978; Tversky and Kahneman 1986), which consider deci-
sion-making to be a series of analytical stages: identify the problem, generate and
evaluate a set of options, implement the preferred option (Flin 1996; Saaty 2008).
However, many decisions are made based on intuition, in a faster, almost automatic
way often termed naturalistic decision-making (Lipshitz et al. 2001). Naturalistic set-
tings are characterised by ill-structured problems, uncertain environments, shifting
ill-deﬁned goals, action/feedback loops, time–stress, high stakes and multiple players
(Zsambok and Klein 2014). Decision-making processes under these naturalistic con-
ditions can be deﬁned as the way people use their experience to make decisions in
real-world settings (Crego and Spinks 1997; Pascual and Henderson 1997; Crichton
and Flin 2002; Klein 2008).
Much discussion has centred on the case for two ‘modes’ of thinking that drive
information processing and decision-making. These have been termed the analytical
and affective processing systems, or ‘type 2’ and ‘type 1’ decision-making (Epstein
1994; Sloman 1996; Chaiken and Trope 1999; Slovic et al. 2004). The analytic (type
2) approach involves slower computational cognitive processes, and is a learnt pro-
cess that consciously and deliberately applies rules and procedures (e.g. formal
logic, utility maximisation) to the analysis of data to ﬁnd the optimal solution or out-
come. The analytic system uses algorithms, normative rules and logic, and does not
operate automatically. It is also oriented towards delayed action, and decisions made
often require ‘justiﬁcation via logic and evidence’ (Epstein 1994). The affective
(type 1) approach is often termed the experiential system, and involves rapid, uncon-
scious affective processes oriented towards immediate action. It is a holistic
approach that reconciles behaviour with past experience (Epstein 1994), and is an
evolutionary adaptation that automatically converts uncertain and adverse aspects of
experience into affective responses (e.g. fear, dread, anxiety). It thus results in peo-
ple interpreting risk as an affective or emotional state or feeling (Loewenstein et al.
2001; Slovic et al. 2004). Even if individuals adopt an analytical process for their
decision, if the outputs from the two processing systems disagree, the affective
system usually prevails (Loewenstein et al. 2001).
Recent debate has questioned if these dual-processing systems are actually
distinct, and whether a uniﬁed theoretical approach is more appropriate to explain
both intuitive and deliberative judgements, and the spectrum between them (Evans
and Stanovich 2013a, 2013b; Keren 2013; Osman 2013; Thompson 2013). Either
way, most of the models of decision-making assume a ‘rational’ model of managing
uncertainty, and do not account for the more affective ways of thinking based on
emotions and experience (Slovic et al. 2004). The current dominant approach to
‘managing’ uncertainty thus underrepresents, and thereby downplays, the role of
emotions and experience. However, by adopting an alternative approach that
acknowledges the embodiment of uncertainty, the affective mode can be better
represented in models of decision-making under uncertainty.
2.3. Communication of uncertainty
Research into the communication of uncertainty in various ﬁelds associated with
natural hazards, and environmental risks more broadly, typically focuses on the com-
munication of uncertain scientiﬁc advice (Löfstedt and Perri 6 2008; Spiegelhalter,
Pearson, and Short 2011). The advice communicated may be subject to many levels
Journal of Risk Research 5
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of uncertainty, including epistemic and aleatory uncertainty (van Asselt 2000; Patt
and Dessai 2005). Much of the research focuses on the most effective methods for
science communications, examining questions like: whether revealing the uncer-
tainty associated with a risk assessment will strengthen or decrease trust and credi-
bility (Johnson and Slovic 1995; Smithson 1999; Miles and Frewer 2003;
Wiedemann, Börner, and Schütz 2008); whether the inclusion of uncertainty will
result in misuse of the information, and a consequent attenuation or ampliﬁcation of
a risk to meet pre-existing attitudes, beliefs and to justify a political agenda (Kuhn
2000); and how the format of probabilities (which encompass the uncertainty) inﬂu-
ence decision-making behaviour and interact with existing beliefs related to career,
knowledge, experience and values (Doyle, McClure, Johnston, et al. 2014; Doyle,
McClure, Paton, et al. 2014).
Recent research has also explored the political uses of uncertainty, as it relates
to, for example, climate change in Brazil, and found that uncertainty is socially and
politically distributed in speciﬁc ways (Taddei 2012). Further studies are required to
understand how uncertainty is dealt with in different social and cultural contexts,
and the ways in which uncertain information and outcomes are both distributed
across society and politically manipulated. This would move towards a better under-
standing of how uncertainty may be managed, ﬁltered and contextualised – i.e.
embodied within each unique context.
2.4. Embodied risk
‘Embodied risk’ has been explored in the public health literature in order to better
understand how individuals make sense of health risks (Kavanagh and Broom 1998;
Mol and Law 2004). Risks may be differentiated as environmental, lifestyle or cor-
poreal (embodied). Environmental risk is delineated as what happens, lifestyle risk
as what we do and embodied risk as an indication of who we are (Kavanagh and
Broom 1998). Embodied risk relates to the ways in which people interpret and make
personal meaning out of diagnoses that place them ‘at risk’. One study explores
experiences of hypoglycaemia from the perspectives of nurse and patient, drawing
on the dualistic nature of the body as an object and as a subject (Mol and Law
2004). The study ﬁnds that the body enacts hypoglycaemia, and argues that medical
treatment should therefore account for interventions into lived bodies and into peo-
ple’s lives. Such studies distinguish the concept of embodied risk from objective
risk, and explore the importance and role of this enactment in shaping the individual
responses and integration of the threat into people’s daily lives.
Under conditions of infrequent and unpredictable hazard events there is a large
amount of uncertainty and ambiguity in deciding whether and how to respond to
risk (Solberg, Rossetto, and Joffe 2010). Social identities contribute to how we see
ourselves and derive group membership. The categorisation of self and of others into
common social identities is a strategy for enhancing cohesion with a given commu-
nity (Fiske 2004; Joffe and Staerkle 2007). Social identities include social norms,
which are rules for behaviour that are constructed within a group or culture, as peo-
ple endorse or passively impose normative behaviours on their members (Solberg,
Rossetto, and Joffe 2010). Social norms inﬂuence attitudes and behaviour (Terry,
Hogg, and White 1999; White et al. 2009). Attributions of responsibility (who is
responsible), and trust are also important mediators that underpin whether actions
are taken to adjust to an identiﬁed risk (Terry, Hogg, and White 1999; Paton 2008).
6 V. Sword-Daniels et al.
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Modelling with substantive data has been used to illustrate how social cohesion
affects the decision to prepare for wildﬁre by facilitating the transfer of information
that can inﬂuence the social construction of issues or problems (Eriksen and Prior
2011; Prior and Eriksen 2013). This raises the salience of risk issues relative to other
everyday considerations among community members. It highlights how responses to
risk derive from a suite of personal and interpersonal characteristics and relation-
ships that affect how we individually and collectively embody uncertainty.
3. The concept of embodied uncertainty
The concept of embodied uncertainty incorporates both the conscious and subcon-
scious lack of certainty. It is common to all, from individuals to societies (Figure 1).
Embodied uncertainty is differentially internalised, depending on past experiences,
social identities, beliefs, values, institutional structures, resources available and
social norms. In a situation of high uncertainty, internalised characteristics inﬂuence
how the multiple dimensions are individually or collectively experienced, interpreted
and acted upon (Figure 2).
This broadened concept of uncertainty promotes a shift in thinking towards
accepting (rather than reducing) uncertainty. By focusing on the lived experience
within uncertain contexts, it accepts uncertainty as a persistent condition of daily life
in many forms, scales and levels of conscious and unconscious decision-making. It
lies on a continuum from (often decontextualised) epistemic knowledge to everyday
practice guided by instinct. Embodied uncertainty is thus distinguished from objec-
tive (disembodied) uncertainty by being both consciously and subconsciously inter-
nalised and subjectively interpreted by individuals. This inﬂuences the ways in
which personal meaning emerges from uncertainty related to risk (Kavanagh and
Broom 1998; Mol and Law 2004). The embodiment of uncertainty gives tangible or
visible form to the feeling of a lack of certainty.
Figure 1. The progressive broadening of the scientiﬁc concept of uncertainty.
Journal of Risk Research 7
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We frame the concept of embodied uncertainty as a verb not a noun because it is
constantly contextualised and enacted. It is the lived experience of both known and
unknown uncertainty. This uncertainty can exist at the level of the individual, fam-
ily, community, organisation and/or institution in different cultural contexts. It may
be positive or negative, providing opportunities to catalyse change or presenting
challenges to overcome. By accepting the complexity of uncertainty, and the multi-
ple ways in which it is understood, internalised and enacted, we move towards
exploring the pluralistic nature of the concept and what this means for everyday life.
The following four contextualised examples explore the concept of embodied uncer-
tainty and exemplify different dimensions of uncertainty. Each of these requires fur-
ther study, and we present them here to promote dialogue on the complex and
heterogeneous nature of uncertainty itself, and to highlight the opportunities that lie
within alternative discourses of uncertainty in the context of extreme natural
hazards.
3.1. Embodied uncertainty, social identities and trauma
As individuals and as a people, whether community or nation state, we have embod-
ied characteristics that we carry with us in daily life. No matter the situation, risky
or not, our actions are born out of our social identities, our socially constructed and
lived experiences of the world, and how social characteristics intersect in everyday
life, such as education, class, age, gender, sexuality, ethnicity and (dis)abilities
(Krüger et al. 2015). These characteristics inﬂuence how we process potential risk,
providing us the ability to assess it in situ. Together, these parts create an embodied
uncertainty about the world in general, and risk in particular.
Figure 2. The concept of embodied uncertainty.
8 V. Sword-Daniels et al.
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Moving beyond visible or tangible social inequalities that impact both environ-
mental and social vulnerabilities and capacities, embodied uncertainty attempts to
‘make visible’ the subliminal differences that underpin people’s decision-making,
ability and willingness to reduce risk. The stratiﬁcation of societies has created both
privilege and oppression based on identities such as race, class, gender, sexuality,
religion, language and citizenship (Pease 2010). These identities, and social expecta-
tions associated with each identity, impact each individual’s sense of self-efﬁcacy
(Merton 1948). Differential social identities then shape the decision-making process,
not only through the rational choice model, but also through the subconscious
identities we embody.
There are many different ways of responding to uncertainty: to some people
uncertainty generates anxiety, to others it is enabling and empowering (Lindell and
Perry 2000). Both of these responses may affect decision-making and life chances.
As some social identities are ﬂuid, so are the embodied uncertainty that may be ben-
eﬁcial or detrimental in different contexts. A businesswoman in the United States of
America and a Quechua woman in Peru may have particular uncertainties in their
respective locations. Have them switch places, and new sets of uncertainties are
born. Further, experiences of trauma and secondary trauma may contextualise how
individuals interpret and act towards risk (Erikson 1976; Gill 2007). For example, in
San Salvador in 2009, tropical storm Ida devastated much of the peri-urban areas.
As a consequence, small rainfall events that followed this disaster invoked wide-
spread fear among residents that a landslide would destroy their communities
(Tellman 2011).
3.2. Embodied uncertainty and the co-production of knowledge
Uncertainty is embodied in the production of knowledge, as we give preference
(consciously or subconsciously) to certain types of information. Scientiﬁc and tech-
nical information can play an important role, but no system of knowledge and deci-
sion-making is completely objective, as psychological, contextual and institutional
factors provide important variables (Bea et al. 2009). Decision-makers assess and
make choices in response to risks using both objective criteria that have external
validity and scientiﬁc legitimacy, as well as criteria that emerge within unique social
contexts (Fearnley 2013). The, often tacit, knowledge that groups and individuals
use to frame dimensions of uncertainty are ﬂuid products of ongoing decision-
making, shared experiences and assumptions and broader mental models. Commu-
nity-based disaster risk management and other participatory approaches provide
mechanisms by which to incorporate this plurality of perspectives into the
co-production of knowledge (Williams and Dunn 2003; Cronin et al. 2004; Gaillard
2006; Cadag and Gaillard 2014). Similarly, joint fact-ﬁnding techniques can be
employed to help groups work through science-intensive policy and planning
disputes to create a shared vision and inform collective decision-making, even in
situations with high degrees of uncertainty (Karl, Susskind, and Wallace 2007;
Schenk 2016). In uncertain situations, robust environmental knowledge can be
created in continual dialogue with societies exposed to natural hazards through both
fact ﬁnding and meaning-making (Jasanoff 2010).
Shared mental models of a situation or perceived risk can be improved through
training, effective team-based simulations, as well as shared scenario-based planning
(Cannon-Bowers and Bell 1997; Crego and Spinks 1997; Paton, Smith, and Violanti
Journal of Risk Research 9
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2000; Pliske, McCloskey, and Klein 2001; Borodzicz and van Haperen 2002;
Keough and Shanahan 2008; Moats, Chermack, and Dooley 2008). By building a
shared mental model of the situation and issue, a more mutual understanding of the
role of uncertainty can be established, as well as shared recognition of the different
ways this uncertainty can be mitigated, managed or embraced. This knowledge
cannot be codiﬁed and transferred easily, as it accumulates organically among stake-
holders with shared histories. That is, it does not exist independently from the actors
that use it, but as an embodied interpretation of the world and how it is shaped. The
meaning and value of situational knowledge does not come from standardisation
and universal acceptance, but from the potency such models have on the ways
in which stakeholders evaluate situations and make decisions in practice. Such
co-produced knowledge is often contested, as stakeholders vie for inﬂuence over the
shaping of the knowledge that is used to interpret risks and make decisions (Adler
and Hirsch Hadorn 2014). Decision-making is also set within the social and political
context of the situation. Power dynamics that were previously maintained may or
may not be challenged, leading to altered outcomes and associated consequences.
The ﬂuidity of power to inﬂuence others in disaster situations therefore necessitates
further investigation.
3.3. Embodied uncertainty, social and institutional structures and policy
The embodiment of uncertainty is also tied to broader social issues. Through the
socialisation process, embedded social norms become embodied subconsciously by
individuals over time. As individuals internalise these norms, they also reproduce
them through their behaviours. Embodied uncertainty, through this reproduction pro-
cess, becomes embedded into broader social processes (Berger 1991; Alaniz 2015).
The same process occurs for institutions, organisations and communities. The way
that an institution, organisation or community embodies uncertainty can become
embedded within its policies and practices. This inﬂuences the ways in which its
members think and act, although they may not be aware of this priming. Instead,
certain framings of risk are implicitly embodied into their everyday activities
through the repetition of certain practices, favouring of particular approaches and
deference to certain narratives. Some individuals or institutions may be more or less
risk adverse, resulting in many different attitudes and responses. Choices are further-
more unevenly distributed across society, and may be constrained when an organisa-
tion chooses to operate in high-risk locations, which affects the ability of staff to
reduce their individual risk.
The ways that barrier island communities along the east coast of the United States
of America assess the risks posed by climate change and evaluate potential responses
provides an example of how uncertainty is embodied within institutions, and subse-
quently reﬂected in their policies (Kettle et al. 2014). Confronted with signiﬁcant
threats, yet determined to maintain their properties and way of life, communities –
both formal municipal organisations, and residents and others stakeholders – are
looking for ways to adapt in situ. Confronted with scientiﬁc evidence that the risks
are getting worse under climate change and the suggestion that retreat may be
necessary (Gutierrez, Williams, and Thieler 2009), uncertainty is used as a way to
downplay and to challenge the extent and nature of the threats (Zucchino 2012).
Even if residents ultimately accept the risks, they feel able and willing to manage
them via their status quo approaches, including evacuating in advance of storms,
10 V. Sword-Daniels et al.
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beach nourishment to maintain shorelines and protect infrastructure and elevating
homes on stilts. The federal and state governments further mitigate the risks by subsi-
dising insurance and providing post-disaster aid to enable re-building. The perception
that extreme weather events can be prepared for and the effects mitigated lends a
sense of security to barrier island residents. Strong interests (ﬁnancial, cultural and
otherwise), community characteristics, past experiences and the ability to evacuate
when necessary, have resulted in low perceptions of risk and a resistance to change
(Peach 2014). Residents downplay the risks to avoid stricter regulations and strongly
resist the notion of retreating or restricting rebuilding. Conscious of the risk, lifestyle
is prioritised and residents choose to remain ‘at risk’ while seeking support to miti-
gate those risks. Their embodied uncertainty may encompass climate and weather
risks, but it also reﬂects concerns over property rights and how the state may
respond.
3.4. Embodied uncertainty as long-term lived experiences
Uncertainty is lived and experienced, and may be inﬂuenced by both known and
unknown factors, past experiences and future possibilities. There may also be time-
scales of consciousness, where it is possible to move between conscious and sub-
conscious awareness of uncertainty, depending on a variety of inﬂuencing factors,
such as decision demands and priorities, attention to other contesting issues, social
contexts and inﬂuences, time and level of exposure. Uncertainty manifests over long
time periods, where past experiences may create a sense of uncertainty about the
future, particularly in locations that are considered to be ‘at risk’. This becomes
embodied into thought and action. This embodiment may be at both individual and
institutional levels, affecting behaviour and decisions that are short-term in response
to speciﬁc hazards, and long-term choices about investment for the future. Such
manifestations of lived uncertainty may inﬂuence patterns of vulnerability and
development over time.
This is observed in the island of Montserrat, West Indies, where the eruption of
the Soufrière Hills Volcano has been ongoing since 1995 (Sword-Daniels et al.
2014). The volcanic eruption prompted a large-scale relocation further from the vol-
cano in 1996, and the enforcement of an exclusion zone, although its geographic
coverage shifted throughout 1996–1997 (Aspinall et al. 2002). The small village of
Salem and its surrounds were placed within the exclusion zone in September 1997.
The hazard map was later re-drawn in 1998, allowing the re-occupation of Salem
from October 1998 onwards (Kokelaar 2002). This village is one of the closest to
the exclusion zone, and has higher risk than other occupied areas further from the
volcano. The sense of impermanence resulting from the one-time evacuation lingers
still, and this embodied uncertainty surrounding the location of Salem has created
reluctance among individuals and infrastructure providers to invest in the area. This
has shaped the development of Salem such that people with lower socio-economic
status, and immigrants from the wider Caribbean region, have higher representation
in this ‘less desirable’ location, where rents are cheaper. Overall, this embodied
uncertainty surrounding the location of Salem has altered vulnerability characteris-
tics, creating a community of renters (rather than property owners), a greater propor-
tion of immigrants with less experience with volcanic hazards and language issues
in risk communication and stalled development with degrading infrastructure over
time because of a lack of investment (Sword-Daniels et al. 2014). Embodied
Journal of Risk Research 11
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uncertainty is exempliﬁed as a long-term process in Montserrat where uncertainty
that is embodied becomes embedded in community demographics and structures.
3.5. Discussion: bringing the themes together
The four contextualised examples discussed above highlight both the relevance and
potential contributions the concept of embodied uncertainty can provide. They also
promote exploration of methodologies and frameworks to develop the idea further.
Together they characterise four different yet intricately related aspects of embodied
uncertainty in the context of extreme natural hazards.
First, social identities and lived trauma are powerful determinants that underpin
people’s patterns of decision-making, ability and willingness to reduce risk. They
constitute key factors for accommodating and coping with uncertainty, rather than
seeking to reduce it. Second, given how uncertainty is also embodied in the pro-
cess of knowledge production, transdisciplinary approaches to the co-production of
knowledge enable a more cognisant and transparent means of dealing with the
inherent epistemic power dynamics that accompany many approaches to risk reduc-
tion. Third, the embodiment of uncertainty is tied to broader social issues, which
can present challenges regarding how to methodologically structure and account
for this broader context. Finally, uncertainty is lived and experienced, and may be
inﬂuenced by both known and unknown factors, past experiences and future possi-
bilities. This, in turn, may inﬂuence patterns of vulnerability and development over
time.
These elements of identity, knowledge (co)production, context and experience,
offer innovative, sensitive and practical insights into the complex ways uncertainty
becomes embodied, as people negotiate uncertainties associated with extreme natural
hazards in the context of everyday life.
4. Conclusion
To examine the concept of embodied uncertainty, we have in this paper explored
multiple dimensions of uncertainty and risk in the context of extreme natural haz-
ards. These dimensions are overlapping and may co-exist in any particular context.
In so doing, we hope to promote further dialogue on the complex and heterogeneous
nature of uncertainty itself. Our premise lies on the acceptance (rather than the dog-
matic reduction) of uncertainty. Embracing complexity, as well as the pluralism of
subjective and inter-subjective uncertainty, is central to this concept. Understanding
the embodiment of uncertainty at the individual, collective, organisational and insti-
tutional levels, at multiple scales and through processes over time, allows a pathway
for multiple meanings to be understood, and new understandings to be constructed.
This opens-up ways of thinking, and approaches for addressing, uncertain situations.
These approaches promote the co-production of knowledge, and embrace multiple
interpretations and solutions. Further, embodied uncertainty shapes interpretation
and action in the context of risk, and can become embedded with time, thus further
shaping decision-making and action. Improved understanding of uncertainty as a
lived experience, rather than solely as an objective entity, establishes a fruitful ﬁeld
of study that has the potential to increase our understanding of the behaviours and
decisions of actors in uncertain and dynamic situations.
12 V. Sword-Daniels et al.
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We raise a number of questions through our analysis, which could be taken
forward by researchers and disaster management and response personnel to further
develop the concept of embodied uncertainty. These include:
• How does embodied uncertainty affect agency, ways of life and decision-
making processes?
• How does embodied uncertainty manifest through time?
• How do social identities affect the embodiment of uncertainty?
• How does the spectrum of embodied uncertainty that exists within and
between different groups manifest in decision-making?
• How can stakeholders collaboratively explore and account for embodied uncer-
tainty to improve decision-making and effectively manage risks?
Further studies (conceptual and empirical) are required in order to fully explore
the tools and approaches needed for the practical application of, or reconciliation
with, the concept. There is much work to be done to advance our understanding of
how risks can be effectively managed, given the embodied nature of uncertainty.
Case studies that explore how uncertainty is embodied before, during, and after dis-
aster events would be instructive in further exploring this concept. The concept of
embodied uncertainty has potential for far wider applicability than the extreme natu-
ral hazards context that grounds our research. Embodied uncertainty is prevalent in
multiple everyday aspects of life that could be meaningfully explored through many
different epistemological research perspectives.
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